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CSAF V. CNO: CORE VALUES AND THEIR CAREER
ENDING IMPACT

by

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Abstract

As Congress, civilian leaders, and the public demand more accountability from service members and our military leaders, the Washington politics can involve cannibalistic witch-hunting at the highest levels. The pressure to be perfect, the one-mistake service, can take its toll on all members of the armed forces; from the airman and seaman to the service chief himself. Leadership is a key factor in this equation and how they guide their subordinates (and themselves) can be just as important. I will focus on two leaders, General Ronald R. Fogleman, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, (1994-1997) and the late Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, (1994-1996).

These two men rose to the highest position within their respective services because of exceptional job performance and their caring for people. However, their own personal values, in which they had been trying to instill within their personnel, increasingly clashed with the political institutional values, and built up to a culminating point. The core values these leaders expanded during their watch bled over into the political arena impacting their effectiveness as service chiefs. The causal effects range from interservice rivalry to cutthroat news media tactics. The focus is not on the methodology in which they ended their military careers, but in the why.

It can be argued that the “politics” of a service chief is nothing new and something to be expected. Perhaps, the extent of the politics and the interrelated personalities of such civilian and military leaders are underestimated. Further, the public criticism is also not

new and should be expected at that level. Is quitting the answer or should commanders fight for what they believe is right no matter what? To be fair, we are not sitting at the same meetings or having the same conversations to understand the full extent of their interaction with the various civilian and military people, and therefore can not make an accurate assessment of the stress level. If you believe in a quality approach to your service, then you must acknowledge that Gen Fogleman set the example. He stood up for his beliefs and was willing to give up a service chief's job for it. He believed he was ineffective, out of touch, and would hurt the Air Force by continuing to serve. ADM Boorda, believed he would bring disgrace to the very institution he so cherished by his "V" device controversy. Both men had very strong values, which ultimately led to two different ways to end their service to their country

Exactly when that time is undoubtedly each leader's personal decision and there will always be many critics on both sides of that decision, but ultimately it is the leader's decision to make and the troops to suffer the benefits or consequences. Since then, there is an increased emphasis in military courses and schools from Basic Officer Training, to the academies, and senior level leadership courses. Core value training continues throughout an individual's career, with new emphasis on the early years, in an attempt to improve military bearing, attitudes, and perceptions that are more in line with society. For Gen Fogleman and ADM Boorda, the very institution they loved and served faithfully, in the end compromised their personal values and forced them to end their military careers.

Chapter 1

The Environment

With the incredible diversity of our organization and the myriad of functions necessary to make it work efficiently and effectively, core values remain unifying elements for all our members. They provide a common ground and compass by which we can all measure our ideals and actions.

—United States Air Force Core Values, 1 January 1997

Introduction

Leadership is one of those challenges that are ever-increasingly coming under the proverbial microscope. The critics range from the news media and government officials to the armed forces' senior leadership right down to the young airman and sailor. The leadership criticism also has no bounds; it targets our commander in chiefs down to the squadron commanders and operations officers. The obvious question is why? Has the culture, militarily or socially, changed so much that even our youngest personnel feel compelled to challenge and criticize their leadership? Maybe we have just fostered the feedback environment so much that it is simply a reflection of these communication tools? Could the military senior leadership be basically out of touch with current values and beliefs of American society?

This paper will focus on two military leaders: General Ronald R. Fogleman, former US Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF, 1994-1997), retired, and the late Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, US Navy Chief Naval Officer (CNO, 1994-1996). Its premise examines how

their deeply embedded and foundational personal values, combined with multiple environmental factors, clashed with institutional values and greatly influenced exactly when and how the two military leaders would end their service to their country. These values guided them as they maintained a determined effort to forge a path tied to the high military standards necessary for mission accomplishment.

Gen Fogleman and ADM Boorda took their strong personal values and molded them into their respective service's core values. Increasingly though, the political institution created friction with this and made them question their effectiveness as leaders.

Limitations

The first limitation of this paper is the fact that no interviews were available from Gen Fogleman and ADM Boorda. The methodology will be primarily periodical and literary studies using primary sources where available. Additionally, this paper will not go into the multiple aspects of the environmental factors such as our political construct and relationships, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), shrinking defense budgets, and military personnel cuts, but will focus on personal and environmental factors which led them to the decision to end their careers. Both Gen Fogleman and ADM Boorda had such strong, similar personal and core value beliefs, which ultimately resulted in two very different ways to deal with the conflict.

With the end of the Cold War, America, especially the political institutions, wants to relish in, enjoy, and most importantly spend the "peace dividend" that the services have for decades fought and died for. Gen Fogleman called this the "period of promise," but this hopeful time holds an uncertain future with many challenges.¹ ADM Boorda highlights a closely related tangent when he describes the popular sound bite of "doing

more with less,” but in fact says the Navy is doing “less with less.”² Both men understand mission accomplishment and meeting force requirements, however, they recognized that cutting and cutting is not the way to achieve proper savings. It must come from leadership, firmly tied to values, and in doing things smarter.

Notes

¹ Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, “Core Competencies—New Missions: The Air Force in Operations Other Than War,” *Airman*, no. 39 (April 1995): 2-9.

² ADM Jeremy M. Boorda, “More With Less,” *Defense News*, 4 December 1995, n.p. on-line, Internet, 29 December 1997, available from <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/flags/boorda/boorda.html>.

Chapter 2

The Men Behind The Stars

Personal Values

Gen Fogleman and ADM Boorda spent an entire lifetime developing their personal characteristics and qualities that shaped their value system. These convictions were benchmarks and highlights as military service chiefs, but conflicted with institutional values causing an internal tug of war.

General Ronald R. Fogleman

Gen Fogleman's first few months gave a glimpse of his message that he would carry throughout his term—caring for people. He understood the turbulence Air Force members were experiencing from the Gulf War drawdown, associated budgetary and composition issues, and wanted to do what he could to stabilize this environment. As a good leader would, he wanted to personally meet the troops in face to face “chiefs” calls in order to see and understand for himself what the force was thinking and explain his vision for the Air Force.

Gen Fogleman's down-to-earth manner is evident in his off duty activities such as reading, woodworking, working on cars, and channel surfing looking for John Wayne or Cary Grant movies to watch. He also is an avid reader claiming “Catch 22” a favorite

book and enjoys Tom Clancy novels. His personal values are exemplified in who and why General George C. Marshall, a leading WWII general, is his personal hero. He believed in his work ethic to be the best at whatever job he was given, his selflessness, and having courage in his convictions to do the right thing. Clearly these are some of the main themes behind Gen Fogleman's Air Force Core Values.

Gen Fogleman's career has given him the opportunity to lead many people, which obviously is one of his strengths. He has a reputation for being able to get along with his subordinates and works hard to take care of them. In his inaugural speech, he outlined his leadership philosophy and goals for the Air Force emphasizing four points which focus on people: "Team within a team," "Stability," "Leadership," and "Quality of life."¹

The first one, "Team within a team," you would expect from any service chief, because why would you accept the job if that person didn't believe in the quality of the men and women who served under him/her? Also, he felt these capabilities must work together with our sister services to defend the nation. The second point, "Stability," demonstrates his connection with the people in recognizing the friction they were experiencing within the service over issues like the pace of force structure changes and increasing operations tempo. His goal was to let the dust settle somewhat before making any major changes.

Gen Fogleman gave considerable emphasis on the third point, "Leadership." He shows another personal trait, humility, by saying that a long time ago he learned the importance of leadership, yet doesn't hold himself up as the poster child of leadership. He basically challenged all members of the Air Force to step up to the leadership plate, because he believed that anybody, officer or enlisted, could be a leader regardless of your

rank. You don't even have to be a commander. Gen Fogleman also believed in a quality Air Force and in bringing out the best in service members. He didn't want the focus to be on catchy phrases. This is where he tied in his four pass-fail items for leadership: "Don't rule through fear," "Never lose your temper or have an outburst of anger in public," "Never tolerate any breach of integrity," and "Zero tolerance for sexual harassment or any kind of prejudice based on race, religion, ethnic origin, age—any kind of discriminator."² These are straightforward and need no discussion. The last point of Gen Fogleman's leadership goal and philosophy, "Quality of Life" shows his true commitment to the welfare of the service's men and women. It is this theme he carried throughout his tenure and which guided his decisions. ADM Boorda's message was also one of caring for his people and rooted in promoting navy core values.

Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda

ADM Boorda's motto was to just deal with the problems at hand because he felt that a Navy, which could not recognize that it could get better, would not. At a late April speech to the Midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy (USNA), he stated that "An organization that does not realize that it can improve is an organization designed to fail."³ ADM Boorda believed in taking the tough issues head-on and not trying to hide their problems from the media or Navy personnel. He was very proud of the Navy and felt that it would only get better from the controversy and debates.

In order to understand this bond and ideal, we must recall his earliest mentor, Navy Chief George Everding. It was he who firmly convinced then, Petty Officer First Class Boorda, to sign papers applying for Officer Candidate School under the Seaman to

Admiral program. He was commissioned an ensign in 1962 and has primarily taken it one year at a time once he hit 20 years.

ADM Boorda's focus was on quality of life issues. He felt medical care was his number one priority and believed his own personal quality of life issues were somewhat different than most, because of his handicapped son.⁴ Accordingly, he wanted to keep watch on the TRICARE medical system to ensure its benefits were leveraged to the maximum extent possible. Navy housing and pay were two other major concerns for ADM Boorda. He put a lot of emphasis into building/upgrading housing, but acknowledged that older housing outpaced new construction. Earning an enlisted salary early on most likely made him sensitive to the pay issue, although he wanted people to understand sailors should not feel impoverished, but that they are adequately compensated. He believed that a sailor was not going to get rich, yet would have enough to take care of his/her obligations. Quality of life regarding the work environment was also important to ADM Boorda. He strongly believed in former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl Mundy's remarks, "Quality of life is also related to your work environment. I think the most important quality of life I can provide Marines is the ability to come back alive from a fight."⁵

Taking a snapshot of ADM Boorda's goals for the Navy when he took over as CNO reads like a laundry list. He wanted the Navy to get a better airplane and they are getting that with the F/A-18E/F. His shipbuilding plan was slowly getting back on track, the Navy was getting more Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and more ships capable of shooting off the famous Tomahawk missiles, not to mention the newer Seawolf attack class submarines. Like Gen Fogleman, ADM Boorda wanted to ease the downsizing

process, yet maintain the high quality of recruits. He revised the evaluation process and restarted the Seaman to Admiral program, but saw work to be done regarding officer career patterns. He believed that naval officers were taking on too much at one time. ADM Boorda's goal was to have officers assume bigger responsibilities, like command, earlier in their career so that they can get to capt or flag officer a little earlier.⁶

ADM Boorda placed the responsibility of taking the cross section of societal values in naval recruits and producing good sailors/leaders on himself and his other senior leaders. His "just deal with it" attitude was for everyone, but he charged that everyday leadership made the difference. His one-on-one leadership concept provided every sailor one leader that he/she could look up to and say "that person is accountable and responsible for me."⁷ ADM Boorda didn't want to take away personal accountability; he just wanted Navy leadership to take a more responsible role in more than one person.

ADM Boorda's vision as CNO was one of providing a better quality of life for navy personnel and was focused on continuous improvement. He had learned a lot from his earlier days as an enlisted member, listened to his supervisors, and tried to bring that to the Navy. He knew it was not a perfect world, but accepted the challenge to fix it and maintained his pride and admiration for the Navy.

Gen Fogleman and ADM Boorda brought strong personal values to their services and a deep sense of caring for their personnel. As leaders, it was from this foundation they forged service core values and tried to personally stand up as the number one example. They would walk the talk.

Notes

¹ Capt Robyn A. Chumley, "We're In Good Hands," *Airman*, no. 39 (January 1995): 2-7.

Notes

² Ibid.

³ ADM Jeremy M. Boorda, (speech to USNA, Annapolis), 24 April 1996, n.p. on-line, Internet, 29 December 1997, available from <http://www.navy.mil/navpalib/www/welcome.html>.

⁴ JO1 (AW) Michael R. Hart, "A Conversation With The CNO," *All Hands Magazine*, 19 April 1996, n.p. on-line, Internet, 12 December 1997, available from <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/flags/boorda/boorda.html>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ ADM Jeremy M. Boorda, (speech to USNA, Annapolis), 24 April 1996, n.p. on-line, Internet, 29 December 1997, available from <http://www.navy.mil/navpalib/www/welcome.html>.

Chapter 3

Core Values

The Air Force is not a social actions agency. It is not an employment agency....The Air Force exists to fight and win wars—that's our core expertise. It's what allows us to be called professionals. We're entrusted with the security of our nation. The tools of our trade are lethal, and we engage in operations that involve risk to human life and untold national treasures. Because of what we do our standards must be higher than those of society at large. The American public expects it of us and properly so. In the end, we earn the respect and trust of the American people because of the integrity we demonstrate.

—General Fogleman

Why are military professionals expected to maintain higher standards and be subject to greater accountability? Is it simply because someone has to do it and so why not the military? No, it is based on hundreds of years of military tradition, history, and sacrifice. As society's values change, it is incumbent upon our leaders to build on irreproachable personal values and provide their personnel the tools with which to guide their actions.

Air Force Core Values

Today when Air Force members think of core values they think of Gen Fogleman and his little blue book. In it he built upon former CSAF, General Merrill A. McPeak's, 1994 attempt to renew our sense of dedication to the institutional mission by sending out a new generation of missionaries to spread the word on this new focus, and believed core

values represented enduring values that can guide us in a changing, more complex and often confusing world.¹

Gen Fogleman used this foundation to develop and strengthen our military profession of arms. He firmly believed that our profession is sharply distinguished from others by what WWI British General Sir John Hackett called the “unlimited liability clause.” He stated, “The profession of arms, to which you are now dedicated has certain unique characteristics. First of all, you serve in a contract of unlimited liability; there is no limit of what may be asked of you. This unlimited liability stamps the military profession as largely unique.”² Gen Fogleman also believed our standards were higher than those in our society at large because of what we do as members of the profession of arms. The Air Force’s core expertise is to fight and win America’s wars and its members are entrusted with the defense of the nation and, within this regard, are expected to live by the highest standards implicit in our core values: *Integrity first, Service before self, and Excellence in all we do.*³

Integrity First

Integrity first is a character trait which serves as our “moral compass” to do the right thing. It embodies other moral traits, such as: courage, honesty, responsibility, self-respect, accountability and justice, which are essential to military units and service to the nation.⁴ The Air Force expects, moreover, demands personnel who are willing to stand up for what is right despite the potential personal cost. Honesty forms the basis for this moral high ground because as military professionals we do not lie, violate technical data, falsify training requirements, or documents. Understanding we are constantly in the public eye and must maintain higher standards than society because of this profession, we

must always demonstrate true responsibility to our job, service, and country while accepting nothing less from our subordinates, peers, and senior leaders. General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, sums up our military profession with respect to moral courage and integrity by saying that it is “the strength of character, the mastery of fear, and the ability to make hard decisions under stress and pressure—and the integrity to do what is right. Integrity is not something we carry to work in a bag and change into at the office. It is not an accessory or part of the fabric of our uniform, it must be part of the very fabric of our individual character.”⁵

In August of 1995, Gen Fogleman clearly underscored his seriousness in service members maintaining higher standards and demonstrating accountability by issuing supplemental performance evaluations for several officers who failed to meet Air Force standards. The incident was the widely publicized April 1994 shootdown of two US Army Black Hawk helicopters in Iraq by two Air Force F-15s under the control of a US AWACS aircraft. He took this historical action, because of the inconsistent application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) action for the personnel involved and the mixed message it implied. His bottom line was that Air Force standards must be “uniformly known, consistently applied, and nonselectively enforced.”⁶

Service Before Self

Today, this Air Force core value generates more heated discussion and debate among members than any other military catch-phrase, yet it simply states our professional duties take precedence over personal desires.⁷ We all at some point in our military careers have taken the oath of office at least once, albeit at basic training, commissioning, reenlistment, or promotion ceremony. Did we not all voluntarily swear to support and

defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic and took that obligation freely without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion? Maybe the words were said but not really meant. Agreed, the 90's have seen the Air Force continually downsized and restructured while maintaining a high operations tempo. As General John B. Sams, Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command, and many others have stated, "we have been to every country in the world except seven, and two of those don't have runways." Is that a problem statement or bragging? Gen Fogleman states, "Inherent in all this is the individual's willingness to subordinate personal interests for the good of one's unit, one's service, and one's nation."⁸

The question then becomes, what really does *Service before self* mean and do all members have to sacrifice their personal lives to be good airmen? Gen Fogleman is driving at expected behaviors such as: respect for other human beings, exercising emotional, physical and verbal self control, while continuing to have faith in the system as you serve your country. It is more than just simply following the rules or being nice to people, it is understanding the rationale behind the rules and exercising good, sound judgement when accomplishing them. Gen Fogleman's believed anyone could be a leader and, in that capacity, should place the value of the men and women under them above their own. Within this focus on people, Gen Fogleman attacks current societal trends that have infiltrated the service. By outlining the Air Force's moral obligation regarding do's and don'ts, he set the boundaries of our accepted ethical climate. He expected members to exercise control in the following areas: anger, appetites (sexual/alcohol), and religious toleration.⁹ Given today's media frenzy toward military conduct, these highlight the sensitive nature of our behavior as military professionals and

why our standards must be above reproach. Lastly, service members losing faith in the system could be the most detrimental of all because it translates into lost faith in the leadership of the service. When individuals doubt and mistrust the leadership it can lead to abuse of the chain of command, because they assume knowledge usually well beyond their experience. They also believe they will get a more truer answer from several levels up. Therefore the *Service before self* core value will have no meaning. Gen Krulak provides another summation, “We must be faithful to our Country, to our Corps, and to each other. This faithfulness is never situational, and it must never be compromised. We must respect each other, believe in each other, trust each other.”¹⁰

Excellence in All we do

As the third Air Force core value, *Excellence in all we do* is our underlying motive as professionals. “It directs us to develop a sustained passion for continuous improvement and innovation that will propel the Air Force into a long-term, upward spiral of accomplishment and performance.”¹¹ The concept covers a wide spectrum of areas to strive for excellence and customer focus, such as: product/service, personal issues, community, resources, and operations. Gen Fogleman recognized this need to concentrate on improving the Air Force’ processes and products and not producing slogans or charts/graphs. He claimed, “It’s time that quality became a way of life in the United States Air Force and that we refocus our program from one of discussion and education to one of more aggressive application and execution.”¹² Part of providing that responsive customer service is your own personal self improvement like continuing Professional Military Education (PME); participating in the various Air Force reading programs; starting/continuing civilian education; and maintaining your physical fitness.

Military members must also work together as a team fostering mutual respect and not being too quick to jump to conclusions before all the facts are known. If the Air Force is going to take care of its people—its most valuable asset, then it must continue to implement policies to protect its material resources that support its people. Gen Fogleman emphasized the need for excellence and pride in our Global Mobility operations by stating “as our big ‘T’ tail aircraft, with the American flag painted on them, fly around the world, they not only represent America, but they are America.”¹³

When professionals strive to excel in all that they do, mistakes can be made. This leads us to the point where if someone is punished for taking risks and making decisions, then it is only natural that the perception is we have a “one mistake Air Force.” Gen Fogleman has strong convictions here, as indicated by saying that “those individuals who strive to do it right, who seek to be dedicated Air Force professionals—day in and day out—need not be concerned about a ‘one mistake Air Force,’ because it doesn’t exist for them.”¹⁴ He realizes mistakes are a normal part of the learning process throughout someone’s personal and professional life, but emphasizes that if an honest mistake is made, then acknowledge it, correct it, and move on. However, Gen Fogleman clearly points out the crucial difference between a mistake and a crime. He says, “Thus, if a service member willfully ignores Air Force standards, falsifies reports, disobeys a superior, engages in inappropriate off-duty behavior or the like, then we must immediately take the appropriate disciplinary action. This is the person who will find it a ‘one-offense Air Force.’”¹⁵ ADM Boorda also did not believe in a one mistake service, but placed a great deal of emphasis on leadership taking a strong role in their troops’ development and using Navy Core Values as a guide.

Navy Core Values

Speak of Navy Core Values and it almost seems like a contradiction in terms. Of course the most vivid and media driven events were the Tailhook 1991 scandal and the 1992 Naval Academy cheating scandal. In October 1992, the CNO Executive Steering Committee revised and adopted the core values of *Honor*, *Commitment*, and *Courage* as the benchmarks for expected behavior and leadership.¹⁶ The belief was that during this period of transition for the Navy, part of their future foundation would be based on the character of each member, from the newest recruit all the way up to the senior leadership.

ADM Boorda reemphasized Navy Core Values, because he had a strong desire to take care of his people and knew that nothing could be accomplished without them. He believed if the Navy fostered an environment where these values can be consistently applied, then every sailor can work to reach his/her maximum potential. ADM Boorda expected commanders and supervisors within the chain of command to take on the large responsibility for the people within their organization in an effort to keep them out of trouble. Core values would help leaders be positive role models of ethical behavior and personal values, because, as professionals serving their country, they are responsible to the country for their behavior both on and off duty.¹⁷ These core values will serve as rules of behavior to guide seamen in their duty performance, conduct, and decisions. Interestingly, the Navy chose this rationale because while accepted societal values had changed, the Navy must also change to reflect these new values. ADM Boorda wanted the Navy to transform the image it sees in the mirror while setting the example through its core values of *Honor*, *Commitment*, and *Courage*.

Honor

This first basic principle represents navy personnel conducting themselves in the highest ethical manner in their dealings with superiors, peers, and subordinates.¹⁸ It means being honest and truthful when working with other people, whether in or out of the Navy, and not being afraid to speak your mind. To use the chain of command or other feedback forums to properly stand up for what you believe in. Of course, from a supervisor's perspective, it also means being able to accept input from junior personnel. These leadership techniques also encourage new ideas from people and stress being able to give people bad news even when it's not what they want to hear. The Navy core value *Honor*, encompasses some similar moral traits as the Air Forces' *Integrity First* core value and taking accountability for your actions. This responsibility theme was part of ADM Boorda's standdown in late 1995. He directed presentations by Department Heads down to Chief Petty Officers to all personnel on the topics: responsibility of the leader, individuals, and toward each other.¹⁹ There is no time limit regarding this core value, meaning sailors' ethical and legal responsibilities must be met twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The Navy's seriousness toward illegal or improper activity, and evidence that the environment has tightened and the accountability bar had been raised, is unmistakable in the fact that even the appearance of such conduct would not be tolerated.

Commitment

The second basic principle for the navy is *Commitment*. *Commitment* to what? The Navy, your job, your family, your spiritual beliefs or all the above? Is this core value an unwritten pledge to something in the future, a state of being in which people feel under moral pressure to act, or simply just a word which has no bearing on your military or

personal life? Under the umbrella of obeying orders, the Navy regards the core value *Commitment* in terms of demanding respect up and down the chain of command.²⁰ This first part is directed more towards human dignity characteristics and the ideal of caring for people. It relates to the Air Forces' core value of *Excellence in all we do* in the fact that all people deserve mutual respect without regard to race, religion, and gender attributes. The second part of *Commitment* deals more with personal attributes in relation to the Navy. Here they are trying to develop people pledged to seeking continuous improvement, both personally and professionally. They encourage professional competence, dedication to duty, reliability, and someone who is willing to maintain their physical health and drug-free lifestyle. This demonstration of high moral character and technical excellence also has a leadership spin to it.²¹ Leaders are to promote this teambuilding and camaraderie among navy personnel to foster pride in their trained duty so that they are committed to positive change and want to improve themselves and their work. Again, ADM Boorda's underlying theme of "taking care of people" is echoed in his standdown message where he encouraged his leadership to do just that because he knew that without them nothing is possible.

Courage

The third Navy core value, *Courage*, covers a broad spectrum of personal and professional attributes. The Navy expects this value to encourage its members to meet the challenges of our profession head on and accordingly, spark service men and women's patriotism and loyalty to the United States and the Navy. This closely aligns with the Air Force's *Service before self* core value. The idea, illustrated in Navy literature, is for everyone, when they make decisions, to keep in mind "...the best interest

of the Navy and the nation, without regard to personal consequences.”²² Mirroring the Air Force, the Navy also expects its members to maintain higher standards of conduct and accountability. Expected behavior includes having the *Courage* to step up to adversity or directly face negative peer pressure because *Courage* functions as their moral guide and fosters an environment free from prejudice or harassment. The Navy interestingly ties loyalty to the nation with personal work ethic characteristics. They imply that true loyalty to the nation is with the honest, careful, and efficient use of given resources. From the leadership perspective, *Courage* implies that leaders embody the core values and promote the safety, professional and personal well being of each member within the unit.²³ “Courage is the value that gives us the moral and mental strength to do what is right, even in the face of personal or professional adversity.”²⁴

The Air Force and Navy Core Values are similar in their intent and expectations for service members. Both Gen Fogleman and ADM Boorda firmly believed in them and had personal values that mirrored them. However, as the political climate surrounding the services and their leaders intensified, the resultant conflict built up to the breaking point causing them to vacate their job as service chief. While it can be argued that at this level, politics and the media factor are not a new concepts, the increasing pressure from the job slowly chipped away at the leaders’ effectiveness.

Notes

¹ Lt Col Alexander B. Roberts, “Core Values In A Quality Air Force—The Leadership Challenge,” *Airpower Journal*, no. 8 (Summer 1994): 40-53.

² Lt Col Richard B. Davenport, “Leading People in Today’s Military,” Maxwell AFB, AL, April 1994, 30p, (Air University (U S) Air War College, Student paper).

³ Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, “Chief: Highest Standards Are Expected,” *Air Force Times*, no. 56 (August 1995): 13.

⁴ Department of the Air Force, *United States Air Force Core Values*, January 1997.

Notes

⁵ Gen Charles C. Krulak, "Honor, Courage, And Commitment," *Marine Corps Gazette*, no. 79 (November 1995): 24-25.

⁶ Fogleman, "Chief: Highest Standards Are Expected," 13.

⁷ Department of the Air Force, *United States Air Force Core Values*, January 1997.

⁸ Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, "The Profession of Arms," *Airpower Journal*, no. 9 (Fall 1995): 4-5.

⁹ *United States Air Force Core Values*, January 1997.

¹⁰ Krulak, "Honor, Courage, And Commitment," 24-25.

¹¹ *United States Air Force Core Values*, January 1997.

¹² Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, "Quotable Quotes From The Chief of Staff," n.p. on-line, Internet, 13 December 1997, Available from <http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets>.

¹³ Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, "Core Competencies—New Missions: The Air Force in Operations Other Than War," *Airman*, no. 39 (April 1995): 2-9.

¹⁴ Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, "Fogleman: Our Behavior Must Merit Trust, Respect," *Maxwell-Gunter Dispatch* 50, no.17 (April 1996): 1-2.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Department of the Navy. *Navy Core Values Instructor Lesson Guide*, 1993.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ "Core Values," *All Hands Magazine*, June 1996, 22.

¹⁹ Message, NAVOP 039/95, 101604Z NOV 95. US Navy. To Commanding Officers And Officers in Charge, 10 November 1995.

²⁰ "Core Values," *All Hands Magazine*, June 1996, 22.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ *Navy Core Values Instructor Lesson Guide*, 1993.

²⁴ "Core Values," *All Hands Magazine*, June 1996, 22.

Chapter 4

The Public and Private Battles

Now that we have outlined Air Force and Navy Core Values through the eyes of former service chiefs, we can take a closer look at the political machine which caused them to give up their jobs. Gen Fogleman's decision to retire one year early as CSAF caused confusion and mixed reactions from his supporters and critics. ADM Boorda's shocking suicide rocked, not only the naval core, but our nation as well. Before formulating an opinion on Gen Fogleman's resignation and ADM Boorda's suicide, we must put them in a fair perspective, and examine some of the publicized events, issues, and environment surrounding the office.

Politics By Any Other Name

Some of the events that reflect Gen Fogleman's accountability theme were the Army Blackhawk helicopter shootdown in Iraq, and associated disciplinary letters for seven officers involved. The Air Force Core Values handbook was published in January 1997, and in June 1997, 1Lt Kelly Flinn received a highly publicized general discharge from the Air Force by Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila E. Widnall. However, the issue which dominated Gen Fogleman's agenda was the Khobar Towers terrorist bombing and Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, punishing Brigadier General Terryl Schwalier, former Commander of the 4404th Wing (Provisional) in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

The media focused on Gen Fogleman's opposition to Brig Gen Schwalier's punishment for the deaths and injuries in the Khobar Towers bombing. In actuality, the conflict was much more complex and had been building for some time. Major General Charles Link, Gen Fogleman's Special Assistant for the National Defense Review, said "The real problem Fogleman faced was that once Cohen decided to punish Brig Gen Terryl Schwalier, Fogleman would have to transmit the order of punishment."¹ That went against his strong belief that Brig Gen Schwalier was not to blame for the bombing and led him to indicate that he would step down if Secretary Cohen went through with the punishment. Secretary Cohen demonstrated his resoluteness when he told the Associated Press the day Gen Fogleman announced his retirement (28 July 1997) that he "never responded to pressure from anyone....I don't think a Secretary of Defense should ever be put in a position where he or she would have to make a decision based on whether an officer should stay or go."² Clearly a "shot across the bow" statement. On 30 July 1997, Gen Fogleman's message explaining his resignation and giving a farewell to the service was released. The next day Secretary of Defense Cohen, backed by General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced he would remove Brig Gen Schwalier's name from the major general's promotion list. Maj Gen Link tried to put Gen Fogleman's decision into perspective stating that it is "...not just about Khobar Towers, Fogleman is trying to live with his conscience....There are two choices: We can salute smartly or step aside. If we forget that we have the responsibility to sometimes step aside, then we just become a bunch of hired thugs."³

Andrew Krepinevich, Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington DC, also believed the friction was bigger than the Khobar

Towers. He said Gen Fogleman had the “perception of the uniformed military’s declining authority to police its own ranks.”⁴ The two prominent examples he uses are Brig Gen Schwalier and former 1Lt Kelly Flinn. Gen Fogleman usually didn’t get involved in cases like hers, but because of all the media and Congressional attention he felt he needed to publicly set the record straight. He agreed with the plan to prosecute her for fraternization, adultery, lying and disobeying an order. However, the Air Force was taking hits in the national media circuit and some members of Congress lost sight of the main issue—an officer who lied several times and disobeyed a direct, lawful order. Secretary Widnall, most likely choosing the path of least resistance, allowed 1Lt Flinn a general discharge in lieu of the courts martial. The message this sends to both male and female military members could be debated much more, but is not the focus of this paper. Basically, Gen Fogleman, although not speaking out publicly, felt betrayed when Secretary Widnall did not back up his decision.⁵

Air Force budget battles can be highly politicized, but Gen Fogleman remained focused on what was best for the Air Force rather than keeping a win/loss scorecard with Washington. He had been losing key resource and budget battles and saw this as further evidence that his recommendations to the political powerbrokers were not being trusted. For example, according to Maj Gen Link, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released in May 1997, left Gen Fogleman feeling betrayed. He in good faith cut the number of proposed F-22 Raptor fighter wings and under pressure addressed a more spread out production time schedule, which he knew made the program more costly and vulnerable in the out years. He did this believing the other services would make similar hard decisions, but this was not the case. A similar side step occurred in the Defense

Department's review of the B-2 Spirit which ultimately changed directions and favored Army resources. Clearly these are oversimplifications of the extensive programming and budgeting processes involved, but indicate there is much more closed door, posturing we are not privy to. Maj Gen Link's insight into the behind the scenes politics undercutting Gen Fogleman is reflected in his statement, "You can't question the secretary's legal authority, but authority can't change conscience. You can't give up principle."⁶ It goes without saying that these types of interactions are not unique to the Air Force, but are also experienced by the Navy leadership as well.

Deja-Vu

The Navy experienced highs and lows like the Tailhook and Naval Academy cheating scandals during his tenure, but what made it so different or was it in fact similar to Gen Fogleman's situation? Clearly the biggest media military feeding frenzy at the time of his death (and likely trigger event) was the controversy over several combat devices, V's for valor, on a Navy Commendation Medal and a Navy Achievement Medal, and whether or not he earned them during his tour on the gunline in the Vietnam War.⁷

ADM Boorda left two notes before taking his life; one to his wife Bettie and the other to his sailors. In it he expresses belief that he didn't rate the valor devices and that when he found this out, he removed them. However, even the service chief himself knew reporters wouldn't believe it was an honest mistake.⁸ The "one mistake" fear is also a common thread in the Air Force so much so that it is being addressed at its highest levels. Secretary Widnall has reassured Air Force members that they are not in a "one mistake" service, but that people are expected to maintain standards.⁹

Nick Kotz, a writer for the *Washingtonian* magazine, claims being CNO had so beaten down ADM Boorda that he intended to resign two years into his four year tour.¹⁰ He informed his son, Navy Commander Ed Boorda, only five days earlier, but was talked out of it by him. He argued that he should stay on to finish the work he started, focus on his nearly 40 years of achievements, especially as CNO, and to put the negatives in perspective.¹¹

One such area of strain was with Navy Secretary John Dalton. According to Kotz, there was bad blood between the two because Secretary Dalton favored another Admiral, Admiral Charles C. Larson, over ADM Boorda for CNO. Also, ADM Boorda had argued to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission in favor of keeping open Meridian Naval Air Station, Mississippi and yet, Secretary Dalton had already testified for its closure. Secretary Dalton believed ADM Boorda had embarrassed him and, not surprisingly, ADM Boorda believed the secretary didn't support him in important policy matters.¹² Another example of the high level political bashing was former Navy Secretary Jim Webb's, disparaging remarks during a late April speech to the USNA calling ADM Boorda a "political Admiral." The pain he felt was more from the midshipmen cheering than the character attack. More behind the scenes negative lobbying came from a group known as the "Old Bulls." These old, line navy Admirals scorned ADM Boorda because they felt he did not fight hard enough with Congress for Admiral Stanley Arthur to be the commander-in-chief of Pacific Forces.¹³ Even though ADM Boorda made repeated admissions he could have done more, the group still chipped away at him. Lastly, one week before his death, Commander John Carey, a

former destroyer commander, sent a letter to the Navy Times calling ADM Boorda a failure and demanding his resignation.”¹⁴

Similar to Gen Fogleman, the media’s piranha-like zeal for a scandal story also played a part in ADM Boorda’s life as service chief. David Hackworth, a retired Army colonel turned reporter and main player in selling Newsweek on the CNO’s medal story, used deception to set up ADM Boorda for a career ending fall in which Hackworth openly bragged he was triggering.¹⁵ He had been asking character questions around Washington about ADM Boorda and caught the attention of Rear Admiral Kendell Pease, Navy Chief of Information, who set up a get-acquainted meeting with ADM Boorda. Hackworth’s trickery led him to substitute two Newsweek correspondents, one of which was Bureau Chief Evan Thomas, in his place on the fabrication that he was stuck in a Salt Lake City airport, when in actuality, he was in his Whitefish, Montana office talking to a journalism class by telephone. He bragged, “I’m working on a big story. Read Newsweek next week,” and later callously remarked to his assistant after finishing the story that ADM Boorda “just might put a gun to his head.”¹⁶

Both Gen Fogleman and ADM Boorda’s decision to leave their respective service chief jobs early clearly were influenced by the public and private battles that waged on the political and military fronts. Just as important was the media’s contribution, and in some cases a causal factor, to the conflicts and their pressure. The question arises as to when the political, military, and media job demands become too much for one to bear forcing a career ending decision.

Notes

¹ Julie Bird, “Why he Did it? For Fogleman, Principle Outweighed The Power And The Perks,” *Air Force Times* 58, no. 1 (August 1997): 12-16.

Notes

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ John Burlage, "Boorda's Final Words/Suicide Note Becomes Public," *Navy Times*, 9 December 1996, n.p. on-line, Internet, 5 November 1997, available from <http://www.mco.com/mem/archives/navy/1996/nt1209hg.html>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Patrick Pexton, "The One Mistake Air Force," *Air Force Times* 56, no. 31 (March 1996): 12-14.

¹⁰ Burlage, "Boorda's Final Words/Suicide Note Becomes Public," n.p. on-line.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

Chapter 5

Conflict Resolution

Gen Fogleman and ADM Boorda both maintained persistent high values and moral character and, as service chiefs, succeeded in re-energizing their service core values. However, before their tours were complete, both men had been beaten down by the system and the media factor that they felt compromised, and forced to leave their jobs.

Culminating Point

Gen Fogleman's decision to retire early before his tour as CSAF was complete, was timed to diffuse the perceived confrontation between himself and the Secretary of Defense over his impending decision on the Khobar Tower terrorist attack.¹ When he took over as the CSAF, his goals for taking care of the service men and women were focused on stability, leadership, and quality of life. As Gen Fogleman developed his career from the early days as an F-100 pilot in Vietnam, to History teacher at the Academy, and held numerous commands, he believed his stock in trade was his military judgment and advice.

After serving as chief of staff for almost three years, my values and sense of loyalty to our soldiers, sailors, Marines and especially our airmen led me to the conclusion that I may be out of step with the times and some of the thinking of the establishment.

—General Fogleman

According to Alan Gropman, a former history instructor at the United States Air Force Academy with Gen Fogleman, his loyalty and subsequent retirement decision came from his strong beliefs about Vietnam. He believes that if more leaders would have taken a stance and stepped down, the country would have taken a different direction and not lost so many lives.² Gen Fogleman's politically correct statement about being out of step with the establishment, again not only speaks of his high integrity and professionalism, but also places him in an awkward position as CSAF. Under Secretary Cohen, if he continued to voice his opposing opinions, he felt it would be seen as divisive and not being part of the team.³ His strong personal convictions for the good of the Air Force had reached a publicly confrontational, culminating point with the civilian leadership. So, as the Air Force's top military expert given the responsibility for leading our service, in an environment where his judgment and advice were no longer being accepted, he chose to step aside rather than let the Air Force suffer.

Same Song...Same Tune

Was this political and military pressure as great on the navy leadership as well? Would the CNO's long established leadership style of caring and nurturing the personnel he supervised be enough to get him through similar tough times? Clearly ADM Boorda felt very strongly about the navy family and wanted the navy to be the best it could be.

Some of the facts surrounding ADM Boorda's last day as CNO, 16 May 96, give insight into his state of mind and again hammer home some of the hidden pressures of the job. He arrived at approximately 1000, was in good spirits and joking, and held three meetings.⁴ Two of which dealt with the premature deaths of two young sailors (one accidental and one suicide) and the third was with the then Chief of Naval Personnel,

Vice Admiral Skip Bowman. That meeting discussed flag officer assignments and an upcoming orientation course for new Admirals ironically, at which ADM Boorda would personally instruct them on ethics and morality.

Later that day ADM Boorda was scheduled to do an interview with David Hackworth, a *Newsweek* reporter. Rear Admiral Kendell Pease, Navy Chief of Information, became suspicious with the interview when he heard of a reporter swap. Hackworth's trickery led him to substitute two *Newsweek* correspondents, one of which was Bureau Chief Evan Thomas, in his place on the fabrication that he was stuck in a Salt Lake City airport, when in actuality, he was in his Whitefish, Montana office talking to a journalism class by telephone. He bragged, "I'm working on a big story. Read *Newsweek* next week," and later callously remarked to his assistant after finishing the story that ADM Boorda "just might put a gun to his head."⁵

RADM Pease called *Newsweek* and inquired about the real purpose of the meeting and was told it would be about the CNO's combat valor devices on some earlier medals. Realizing the setup, RADM Pease went to see ADM Boorda right away and was able to meet with him about 1215. ADM Boorda inquired almost rhetorically what should be done about the interview, but answered his own question by saying, "I know [Kendall], we'll simply tell the truth."⁶ This statement does not reveal the internal contradiction ADM Boorda was feeling, because as previously stated, he did not believe any reporters would believe his honest mistake. It's as if he felt the sand in his hourglass had run out. The people around him saw that he was upset and somewhat frustrated over the situation, but not upset enough to actually commit suicide. ADM Boorda "waived his lunch away" and let everyone know he would skip a meeting with Deputy Secretary of Defense, John

White, and instead go home.⁷ He stated he would return for the interview and left for his car. His driver was not around so he insistently drove himself home after refusing several times the assistance of the duty aide. Upon reaching his residence, ADM Boorda went upstairs to his second floor study, wrote the two notes to his wife and his sailors, went out into the back garden of Tingey House and took his life.⁸

When is it time to go? The pressure to be perfect, the one mistake service, can take its toll on all members of the armed forces. The increasing emphasis on accountability and responsibility are not lost from our leadership, in fact they are promoting it, but at what cost. Our leaders' judgement and advice are their strong points, but only if it is accepted and valued. When we, the subordinates, view their struggle between personal and institutional values, we can only wonder how that will transcend down to the force. Without clear guidance, the question of how exactly to interpret the personal and institutional values becomes difficult.

Notes

¹ Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, "I Do Not Want The Air Force to Suffer," *Air Force Times* 58, no. 1 (August 1997): 15.

² Julie Bird, "Why he Did it? For Fogleman, Principle Outweighed The Power And The Perks," *Air Force Times* 58, no. 1 (August 1997): 12-16.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Jon Anderson, et. al., "Boorda's Final Hours/Navy Report Released," *Navy Times*, 11 November 1996, n.p. on-line, Internet, 11 November 1997, available from <http://www.navytimes.com>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Watch your thoughts; they become words. Watch your words; they become actions. Watch your actions; they become habits. Watch your habits; they become character. Watch your character; it becomes your destiny.

—Secretary of the Air Force Widnall

Today's environment requires stronger leadership and guidance than in the past because of society's changing values. Unfortunately, just as demanding are the critics for increased accountability and search for hidden agendas. Gen Fogleman and ADM Boorda gave their all to their services, sacrificing many things for their country over the years. They showed a deep compassion for their troops, and steered their service men and women through a maze of disintegrating societal/military values. Their strong personal values, anchored in common traits like integrity, commitment, courage, and excellence, were echoed as they refined, shaped, and molded old service core values. While the forces believed in them and that they were taking them in the right direction, the political arena proved to be a hurdle too large to get over. Especially, the institutional leadership and the news media, which in the end was too powerful of a machine—something had to give. Their judgement and reputation were their badges and when that was no longer respected or needed by the system that they served, then it's time to stand on principle and move on.

So, what message has two of our most popular service chiefs conveyed by leaving their job, with all its perks and power, before their term was up? The point is not to discuss their methodology (although one is clearly more appealing and morally on higher ground than the other), but the conflict between personal and institutional values. We must examine the underlying issues that caused them to leave what many others have only dreamed of achieving. One thing is certain, to date, historians have treated them far better than their critics ever have, but there is a pattern, a common ground among their personal and professional lives.

With that said, it would only be fair to note a few critical points. First of all, although the surface-level stresses and strains our commander-in-chiefs are under, is somewhat obvious and recognizable to most, the unobserved situations and events are what we must be cognizant of. Without being at their high level of meetings, seeing the interaction/non-interaction between agencies, dealing with politicians, civilians, and other military members in positions of power, an accurate assessment of the stress level can not be made. You must walk in their shoes to have a full appreciation. However, one would expect at that level surely the pressure is not new and must be understood as part of the job, albeit maybe underestimated. Our leaders go into these jobs with the energy and vision that of a young airman or sailor and an attitude that they can make a difference and apparently are coming out tired, older, beaten, and perhaps politically savvy men.

A second point worth noting is the issue of quitting. These leaders were chosen and voluntarily accepted the responsibility, pressure, risks and rewards. Some believe that this leadership responsibility means to continue fighting for your service for what you believe is right no matter what the costs and to die on the vine or be fired for your beliefs.

This assertion that a leader must be willing to fall on his/her sword for every battle is easy for the Monday morning quarterbacks. It dismisses the fact that commanders, with given resources, can choose their battles. Again, without shadowing them, is it fair to judge their performance on our perceptions without having all the facts? Can we honestly say they did not fight the good fight for their troops? We most certainly do expect 200 percent effort out of a leader and it his/her duty to put the welfare of the troops before that of his/her own. However, we also expect smart, thinking leaders who also know when they are no longer effective and begin hurting their people. Do we really want the selfish leader to go stubbornly on, not see the forest through the trees, and not put the unit's best interests first?

A third lesson is setting the example. Not from the sense of condoning suicide or debating the timing of retirement, but knowing when you're hurting your fellow service men and women and recognizing it is time to leave. Gen Fogleman highlights this best with two of the Air Force's core values—*Integrity first* and *Service before self*. Do we not want our leaders to act in the manner in which they lead? He believed we must set the example of principled behavior for all to observe and to do the right thing even when no one is looking.¹ He further contends that it is this example which motivates others to act with similar integrity and self-sacrifice characteristic traits. Therefore, we should respect him for having the courage to stand up for the principles he believes in and setting the example. Gen Fogleman did not retire in a blitz of media because he was a professional to the end. He did not sensationalize the issue; he did not go out slandering or blaming top officials and, in fact, only blamed himself and tried to diffuse a potentially damaging situation for the Air Force. He had given it the good fight and felt it was no

longer in the best interest of the Air Force to remain its chief. What more of a leader can you ask for where once he believes he is no longer serving effectively, steps aside so someone else can. I would call that an extraordinary sacrifice.

Lastly, is the issue of what does two of our services chiefs leaving before their term was up say about the job and system? Are we placing square pegs in round holes? What does this say if leaders are forced out? Our civilian leaders obviously took note of these issues, but did they examine the story behind the story? Were they able to recognize that the CSAF and CNO's personal and institutional values and beliefs clashed in such a manner that forced them to leave their job so abruptly? Is the current system appropriate and do we prepare our military leaders enough for the semi-political job as service chief? Are we even preparing the young airman and sailor to function in today's high military ethical climate?

Moving Forward

Today, in a military that mirrors society, core values are being taught from our basic training courses to inclusion in leadership development courses. For example, the Navy's Recruit Training Center's course curriculum focuses on *Honor, Courage, and Commitment*, expresses these elements in their memorized sailor's creed, and continues to search for any links between training objectives and core values.² Similarly, the Air Force's Officer Training School and the Air Force Academy teach core values to its trainees/students through a series of readings and lectures. They learn such things as, Quality Air Force basic principles, strategic planning, customer focus, metrics, and the continuous improvement process.³ The Marine Corps has recently lengthened its basic training course to add an extra week focused on indoctrinating core values and "At West

Point, the honor code officer in each unit was supplemented by the ‘respect for others officer.’”⁴ Obviously, core value training continues throughout one’s career, but the focus is on the early years now with our new military members. They are bringing society’s popular culture, values and ethics into a military that still has some leaders believing in the good old days. It’s military bearing, attitudes, and perceptions that they are trying to influence and build into political correctness.

We had two officers who rose to the highest position within their respective services (CSAF, CNO) because of exceptional job performance and care for people. However, their own personal values they had been trying to instill within their personnel, increasingly clashed with the political institutional values, and built up to a culminating point—a point which forced them to choose to end their duty as service chief. Ironically, the very institution which serves as an example to the world and which these men served so well, in the end compromised their personal values. General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, “...remember the worst kind of poverty is not economic poverty, it is the poverty of values.”⁵

Notes

¹ Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, “Integrity,” *Air Force Magazine*, no. 79 (February 1996): 90-91.

² John Burlage, “Core Values Key To Recruits’ Success,” *Navy Times*, 28 October 1996, n.p. on-line, Internet, 1 February 1998, available from <http://www.navytimes.com>.

³ Air Education and Training Command Basic Officer Training School Instructor Guide, *Leadership Studies*, June 1997.

⁴ John Hillen, “Teaching Values to Beavis And Butthead,” *Navy Times*, 15 December 1997, n.p. on-line, Internet, 1 February 1998, available from <http://www.navytimes.com>.

⁵ Department of the Navy, *Navy Core Values Instructor Lesson Guide*, 1993.

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